tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7664137943824779209.post1097468435531725709..comments2023-10-08T05:31:00.508-04:00Comments on khaliphilosophy: UnderstandingKKhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07535420083612229353noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7664137943824779209.post-21787776883406281992012-03-21T12:38:14.495-04:002012-03-21T12:38:14.495-04:00I'm going to echo Josh's point here about ...I'm going to echo Josh's point here about the feeling that many disagreements about what does constitute knowledge and/or understanding is a linguistically semantic debate - especially around the term understanding (like the discourse we had about Why and How questions). What constitutes understanding? Providing a good explanation, or demonstration? <br /><br />Additionally, I would like to fully vet both sides in the Grimm v. Morris before I truly make a distinction and/or decision on which side I would take.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7664137943824779209.post-20143409248358458492012-03-21T11:10:10.451-04:002012-03-21T11:10:10.451-04:00Add on to James' first point, i am not sure ho...Add on to James' first point, i am not sure how the Grimm/Morris debate helps much with my understanding or knowledge of understanding/knowledge. And i think my uncertainty has to do with the overall approach of both articles. I am sure we can find examples in which knowledge and understanding overlap/differ, so why is either side of the debate so sure about the relation between knowledge and understanding (especially since Grimm makes the argument that understanding is a sub species of knowledge)? <br /><br />Also, given how much both articles appeal to various kinds of intuitions, would a discussion on belief help clarify the differences/similarities between Grimm and Morris's concepts of understanding and knowledge? Moreover, would the differences between the relationship of belief&understanding and that of belief&knowledge help us get closer to some fundamental differences between understanding and knowledge? But that could just be my intuition...MGhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07078428078750265836noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7664137943824779209.post-15887476547161236712012-03-21T10:51:25.048-04:002012-03-21T10:51:25.048-04:00I have a question that for me has to come prior to...I have a question that for me has to come prior to the Grimm/Morris debate. Why is there such a large consensus that the etiology of a belief matters for whether it counts as knowledge? That does not seem obvious to me at all, and in fact is contra my intuitions.<br /><br />I haven't totally fleshed out my ideas about this, but I often feel that a lot of these disagreements about what constitutes knowledge and/or understanding have to do with disagreements/misunderstandings of the semantic content of the given (linguistically-formed) propositions.Josh Taylorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04275495963501501976noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7664137943824779209.post-37839190363952277382012-03-20T22:08:20.767-04:002012-03-20T22:08:20.767-04:00I'll start by saying that I'm not wholly c...I'll start by saying that I'm not wholly convinced by Grimm's arguments if only because his evidence for understanding being a species of knowledge seems to be entirely negative. That is, by asserting that understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered (my new favorite verb), he seems to do nothing more than show that understanding shares some traits with knowledge. This does not seem to be a particularly strong endorsement of his titular assertion.<br /><br />On a largely unrelated note, I think it would be interesting to consider our intuitions (yes, those) about a continuation of a modified Comanche case. Suppose that Inquirer was not so lucky as to choose a good textbook. He nevertheless went on to believe that the barter system of the Comanche honed the traits that made them good conquerors. Then, later, he learned about his precarious epistemic situation. As makes sense, he goes on to conclude that he does not have knowledge of the Comanche and their territorial dominion. <br /><br />It seems to me, however, that we would still say that Inquirer still has some measure of understanding. Namely, he understands how, if the information that he read were true, how it would lead to such domination of the Southern Plains. I'm wondering whether this example clarifies at all our notion of understanding as distinct or not from knowledge. It seems that it's still compatible with understanding being a species of knowledge but that it still distinguishes it from a simple knowledge of causes.James H.https://www.blogger.com/profile/07156815803180619576noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7664137943824779209.post-8706987844900186242012-03-20T19:55:09.477-04:002012-03-20T19:55:09.477-04:00Couple of unrelated thoughts:
1)In general, I felt...Couple of unrelated thoughts:<br />1)In general, I felt that Lipton’s article was well reasoned, barring some major assumptions. In fact, I thought his identification and explanation of the use of subjunctive questions – what is potentially the case, if true – was particularly insightful. However, I was deeply disappointed that he assumed several kinds of realism and then claimed that IBE could then be used to support other additional types of realism.<br /><br />2)Regarding Grimm’s article: In addition to Taylor’s objections and Morris’ rebuttal (mostly revolving around what Gettier means for understanding), I think that Grimm’s definition of knowledge on page 522 will end up being too strict (i.e., we will only be able to make very limited knowledge claims). Additionally, I disagree with Grimm’s likeliness of accuracy criterion for good sources of information — why not loveliness? Furthermore, I want to explore Grimm’s claim that fundamentally, “our understanding of natural phenomena seems conspicuously factive” rather than explanatory.Andrew Podrygulahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00100208483881339608noreply@blogger.com