Understanding and Truth

Let’s take stock of where we are. We’ve seen that if Inference to the Best Explanation is to be defensible, then there must be some link between loveliness and likeliness. In other words, we infer that explanation that, if true, would provide the greatest understanding. Furthermore, we’ve argued that understanding might be a species of explanatory knowledge. In this case, we infer the potential explanation that, if true, would provide the greatest explanatory knowledge. Given what we know about knowledge, this means that IBE amounts to the following:

All else being equal, an explanation provides the greatest understanding if and only if it:

1.     Provides the greatest number of true beliefs about explanations;

2.     Provides the best justification for these beliefs; and

3.     Renders these beliefs as luck-free or ‘safe’ as possible.

(A passing observation: There will be circumstances where these three conditions pull us in opposite directions. In this case, IBE will not provide clear counsel, or we will need some way to rank conditions (1)-(3)’s inferential importance.)

            We’ve already had a go at condition (3), when we discussed Morris vs. Grimm. This week, we’ll look at (1). After giving a brief gloss on Khalifa vs. Lipton, I’ll devote a chunk of this to Elgin’s paper. We can discuss further details about how Lipton and I disagree in class.

(1)  Lipton vs. Khalifa

Inferentially speaking, the first of these conditions is most important, since an inference is typically assessed by how well the truth of the premises secures the truth of the conclusion. However, this is also the most contentious claim in this week’s readings. Moreover, challenging the role of truth in understanding forces a corresponding adjustment in the role of belief, for to believe that p entails taking p as true. While Lipton finds nothing problematic with these points, Elgin and I demur. I’ll quickly go through my schtick vs. Lipton.

One challenge to the idea that understanding entails true beliefs is that we have no means of making sure that a true explanation is to be found among the potential explanations that we’re considering. This is called the underconsideration or bad lot argument. Historically, this gets lots of purchase from the fact that many of current best explanations (coming from relativity, quantum, evolution, plate tectonics, etc.) were not considered for long stretches in the history of science.

Lipton tries to dispel this worry on more or less a priori grounds, by setting certain kinds of ground rules, e.g. the Ranking Premise, the claim that scientists reliably rank explanations. He attempts to show that this cannot be held consistently with the No Privilege assumption, which holds that no true explanation is to be found in the ranks of considered explanations. As I show, Lipton’s argument fails to account for the non-monotonicity of inductive inference. Non-monotonicity is the idea that the goodness of an inference is affected by the addition of new information, such that A is a good reason to believe B, but A & E is not a good reason to believe B, A & E & F is a good reason to believe B, etc.

Realists also are fond of invoking background theories to make their case. Roughly, the idea is that some aspect of explanatory reasoning would be very unlikely if the background theories used in such reasoning were radically false. As I argue, these appeals generally don’t live up to their billing, in large part because something less than true background theories could do the trick.

Since we understand a good deal, I don’t think that the first condition is necessary for understanding: a good explanation might not provide very many true beliefs about explanations. Note that this denial can be heard in at least three ways:

(A)  A good explanation can provide very few true beliefs about explanations;

(B)  A good explanation can provide many untrue beliefs about explanations;

(C)  A good explanation can provide many true non-beliefs about explanations.

These can—but need not—intersect. My paper says nothing about the quantity of explanations a good explanation provides, though since I think explanatory virtues/considerations can be justificatory, and consilience is a virtue, let’s drop (A) from further consideration: a good explanation has to explain a lot.

            That leaves us with (B) and (C). Furthermore, I’ve put them in negative terms, but of course they also admit of positive glosses. Specifically, I had in mind the following:

(B_K)     A good explanation can entitle people to beliefs about explanations.

Essentially, this says that we should give up on the truth that good explanations provide, and focus on the justification. (I do make some concessions to veriphiles, but the kind of concessions that aren’t likely to make them very happy.)

Questions

1.     Adopt the position of Lipton, and read my paper. Am I uncharitable to him at any juncture?

2.     Even if my criticisms are right, my antirealist proposal may be wrong. Give me hell.

(2)  Elgin’s “True Enough” (2004)

Elgin provides a distinct set of challenges to the idea that understanding provides true explanatory beliefs. (She doesn’t say too much about explanations, so let’s bracket that issue for now.) The next few weeks or so, we’ll be focusing quite a bit on her work, as she provides a really interesting challenge to my view. Roughly, Elgin argues that understanding is not factive (i.e. doesn’t entail truth). Since knowledge is factive, this would appear to imply that understanding is not a species of knowledge. Bad news for my view, right?

             I’ll explain why I’m not worried (yet) by Elgin’s challenge, perhaps in class. First, I want you to see how I go about readying myself for addressing work with which I aim to disagree. The first crucial step is getting the person’s arguments down. So that’s where I’m starting:

Elgin’s Main Argument:

(1)  There are some phenomena p such that for some propositions x:

a.     x is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.     x figures in scientific understanding of p.

(2)  For all propositions x, if x figures in scientific understanding of some phenomenon, then x is epistemically acceptable (120).

(3)  There are some propositions x such that x is acknowledged to be untrue and x is epistemically acceptable.

(NB: The aim is to always reconstruct the author’s argument so as to make it valid. This is an important principle of charity, and also frees you up to focus on the veracity of the premises.)

Arguments for Premise (1)

A. Curve-Smoothing

(CS)     There are some phenomena p, represented by a smooth curve C, such that the proposition all of the data points lie on C:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

Argument for (CS.b.ii):

In the relevant examples, consider an extremely jagged curve C* such that all of the data points lie on C*.

Because C* is jagged, C is not an intelligible pattern.

But if C is not an intelligible pattern, then p is not understood scientifically.

B. Ceteris Paribus

(CP)    There are some phenomena p, explained by some law of the form All else being equal, all Fs are Gs, such that the proposition all else is equal:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

C. Idealizations

(I)        There are some phenomena p, explained by some idealized law L, such that the proposition L:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

Example: Ideal gas laws posit molecular structure and interactions that never obtains.

D. Stylized Facts

(SF)     There are some phenomena p, such that the proposition representing p:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

Example: Economic models aim to explain why profit rates are constant, though profit rates are not constant.

E. A fortiori arguments from limiting cases

(AF)    There are some phenomena p, explained on analogy with a limiting case C, such that the proposition is p is identical to C:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

Elaboration of Premise (2)

Elgin doesn’t really argue for (2). Instead, she provides a plausible just-so story about how epistemic acceptance could diverge from belief:

(1)  To cognitively accept that p is to take it that p’s divergence from truth, if any, does not matter cognitively.

(2)  If something figures in an understanding of how things are, then it matters cognitively.

(3)  To cognitively accept that p is to take it that p’s divergence from truth, if any, does not figure in an understanding of how things are, i.e. p is “true enough.” [See 120]

Elgin continues this elaboration (A), and then rebuts a potential objection (B).

A. Under what conditions does divergence from the truth cognitively matter?

Let p be a candidate for acceptability. Acceptable propositions “belong to and perform function in [i.e. figure in] larger bodies of discourse, such as arguments, explanations, or theories that have purposes.” (121) Whether or not p is true enough depends on several contextual factors:

(Context)   The larger body of discourse D to which p belongs. For example, other elements in D, such as background assumptions, affect p’s acceptability.

(Purpose)  p is true enough for D’s purpose, i.e. true enough to serve certain D’s ends.

(Function) If p performs no role in achieving D’s purpose, then p is not true enough.

B. Veritistic Alternative, with Reply

Those who hold that inquiry is always truth-driven (veritists), might well argue that the function of all acceptable propositions is to approximate the truth.

Elgin’s critiques of this proposal:

(1) Not all approximations perform the same function (122). Some approximations are less accurate, but better “serve as evidence or constraints on future theorizing” than their more accurate counterparts, e.g. a first-order approximation that admits of an analytical solution vs. a second-order equation that does not. In this case, “A felicitous falsehood thus is not always accepted only in default of the truth. Nor is its acceptance always ‘second best.’ It may make cognitive contributions that the unvarnished truth cannot match.” (122)

(2) Not all felicitous falsehoods are approximations. The value of an idealization is not always directly proportional to its approximating the truth.

Fictions

If you're still on Elgin's bandwagon at this point, she's still elaborating her very interesting picture of understanding. In particular, how is it that an acceptable proposition can be false (strictly speaking) yet provide understanding that is somehow constrained by the facts? Elgin suggests that acceptable propositions (what she sometimes calls "felicitous falsehoods") are better construed as fictions than as mistaken or inaccurate statements of fact. Elgin then elaborates that fictions shed light on reality through a cognitive process called exemplification (A), and rebuts an objection to this proposal.

  

A. Exemplification

Elgin argues that various proposals by Lewis, Walton, Yablo, and Kitcher about fictions all fail because they cannot tell us why something fictitious can shed light on how we understand real things.

She offers exemplification as a more promising alternative.
 

1. A simple example of exemplification: Paint samples exemplify the colors of different paints.

           

2. Why acceptable propositions are just like paint samples: Just as “something other than paint can serve as a paint sample, affording epistemic access to a color also instantiated by the paint,” so “something other than [e.g.] a molecule exemplify molecular structure, thereby affording epistemic access to a structure also instantiated by the molecule. A felicitous falsehood then is a fiction that exemplifies a feature in a context where the exemplification of that feature contributes to understanding…They qualify as fictions because they diverge from the phenomena in unexemplified properties.” (126)

B. Possible Objection: Exemplifying Fictions are simply a way station to the truth

We often begin with a highly idealized model, and then make corrections to get closer to the truth. Hence, it’s the corrections, rather than the fictions that they correct, which are more epistemically valuable. As before, this would play into the veritist's hands.

Elgin offers three replies to this objection:

(1)   Some corrections are unnecessary or unproductive. A fortiori arguments from limiting cases are one such example.

(2)   In practice, corrections are not always aimed at truth, but only at more refined models. “They replace one falsehood with another.”

(3)   Even where corrections yield truths, fictions can “structure our understanding in a way that makes available information we would not otherwise have access to.”

C. Possible Objection: Replacing Truth with Truth-Enough Leads to Intractable Relativism

There is a still another objection to Elgin's view. Suppose that a theory attesting to the healing powers of crystals is offered, and the inquirer in question aims to sell more healing crystals. Won’t the claim that some crystals heal be true enough?

Elgin’s Reply: “A theory can claim to make sense of a range of facts only if it is factually defeasible—only if, that is, there is some reasonably determinate, epistemically accessible factual arrangement which, if it were found to obtain, would discredit the theory.” (129)

Furthermore, “an acceptable theory must be at least as good as any available alternative, when judged in terms of currently available standards of cognitive goodness.” (129)

This helps to pinpoint truth’s role in understanding: “A factually defeasible theory has epistemically accessible implications which, if found to be false, discredit the theory. So a defeasible theory, by preserving a commitment to testable consequences retains a commitment to truth.” Such a view is still compatible with there being other propositions in the theory which are acknowledged to be false.

Questions

1.     Look at Elgin’s various arguments (the Main Argument, the Arguments for Premise (1), and the Argument for Premise (2)). What strikes you as a dubious piece of reasoning? Why? Can you provide an argument to that effect?

Understanding and Explanation

Thus far, we've been considering the idea that understanding is a species of explanatory knowledge. Last class, we examined the idea that understanding might not be knowledge; in this class, we'll examine whether understanding always has to be explanatory in nature. My view is that explanatory knowledge is the ideal mode of understanding. de Regt's essay challenges the sufficiency of this view, arguing that an extra dimension of skill/insight must be added to explanatory knowledge in order to achieve understanding. Lipton's essay challenges the necessity of explanations for understanding. I've offered arguments as to why I think that both are mistaken. What do you think?

Understanding

Thus far, we've explored the idea that explanations guide us to the truth. To the extent that we've entertained challenges to that view, it's the explanatory skeptic's claim that explanations lack any uniform properties that could reliably underwrite inferences. However, the explanationist has three ways of sidestepping that worry.

The first is a direct attack on skepticism, as Nickel does. Similarly, even if Nickel's arguments don't work, an explanationist can start to look at more concrete skeptical views--such as my accountabilist and expressivist ideas--and find faults with them. Second, even if explanationists concede a good deal to explanatory skepticism, they can pick out a class of explanations that do underwrite inferences. Here, Lipton hones in on the most plausible candidate: causal explanation. Yet a third explanationist tactic is to claim that it is not the concept of explanation that underwrites Inference to the Best Explanation, but rather the notion of the best that guides us to truth. This invariably leads to the question, "What makes one explanation better than another?" Lipton's answer is "Loveliness," or that which provides the greatest potential understanding.

Lipton has already told us a bit about understanding--specifically it is knowledge of an explanation. (Recall his claim on p. 30: "Understanding is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge: knowledge of causes." Following Lipton's move in this week's chapter, we'll abstract the causal bit.) This would suggest that the best explanation is the one that would provide the greatest potential explanatory knowledge. Here "greatest" might mean "most," suggesting that we infer the explanation that would allow us: (a) to know more about it than its rivals, and (b) to know more explanations than would its rivals. However, "greatest" might also mean "best," in which case we need to have some way of judging what makes one body of explanatory knowledge better than another. Undoubtedly, (a) and (b) figure in such judgments, but others include theoretical virtues such as simplicity, conservatism, analogy, and consilience. (Arguably, consilience is exhausted by (a) and (b).)

However, this all presupposes that understanding is a species of knowledge, which brings us to squarely back to the crash course in epistemology from Week 1 (Scott Sturgeon's article). Recall the Gettier problem: one may have justified true belief, yet if one's belief easily could have been false, then a person does not know what she believes. For instance, suppose that I see an animal with white fluffy fur at Duclos Sheep Farm down the road from the College. Since I have seen sheep there quite regularly, I believe that there is a sheep in the field. Hence, my belief is justified. However, unbeknownst to me, I am seeing a shaggy dog who is perfectly occluding my view of a sheep. So although my belief is justified and true, it appears that I do not know. That is a Gettier case.

Some, most notably Jonathan Kvanvig, have argued that understanding is not a species of knowledge precisely because it is unaffected by "Gettier Luck." Kvanvig's case runs as follows: suppose that you pick up a library book at random on Comanche history. You read the book diligently, grasping how various explanations make sense of a large and well-studied body of evidence. When asked about Comanche history, you fire back a bevy of true answers. Wouldn't you say that you understand a good deal about Comanche history, including particular events in that history, e.g. why they dominated the Southern plains? Now, Kvanvig adds, suppose that the book you pulled from the library happened to be the only one on the shelf that had accurate information about Comanche history. Had you grabbed any other book on the Comanche, your beliefs would have been false. So, just like the sheep example, you don't know, because your belief could have easily been false. Yet your understanding seems unblemished by this fact.

(The analogy is sheep:shaggy dog::good Comanche book:shoddy Comanche book.)

Grimm critiques, and Morris defends, Kvanvig's stance on lucky understanding. [Where do you stand? Why?] Obviously, Grimm's view is more in line with Lipton's, but it is an interesting (and relatively unexplored) question as to how the possibility of lucky understanding affects IBE. Minimally, it would appear to lower the standards on what counts as the best explanation, as one would not need evidence that one's belief in the explanation could have easily been false. However, this presumably increases the riskiness of using IBE as a rule of inference. So if there are reasons for thinking that understanding is compatible with luck antecedent of any considerations of IBE, then perhaps the proper lesson is that IBE is not a reliable rule of inference.

Update on my Expressivism Paper
Our conversations from last week have prompted me to take a step back, and ask a more elementary question, "What is a pragmatic theory of explanation?" I'm also looking at the kind of argument that could provide good reasons to favor such a theory. It's turning out to be a fascinating exercise. I'll share once I'm further along. 

An Expressivist Theory of Explanation?

So you’re now in a position to see the first of the papers that I’ll be working on this semester. This paper aims to take my “Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts” and turn a rather clumsily formulated social epistemology of explanation into an expressivist theory of explanation. I’ll go through this in four stages. First, I’ll give you expressivism in a nutshell. Second, I’ll give you the three core ideas from my “accountabilist” approach to explanation. Third, I’ll briefly sketch how to convert these into an expressivist account, and fourth, what benefits it holds.

Before proceeding, let me add that all of these thoughts are brand spankin' new. I literally began piecing together these ideas Sunday afternoon, and have had a steady diet of interruptions throughout their formulation. What I really want from you is a full battery of questions about this. I also want you to switch hats, from being altogether critical of this idea to really trying to inhabit and see it to its proper development. 

For all I know, this is a hair-brained idea! This is actually a good thing to learn about the writing process. For every published paper that I have, there are tens of thousands of words that I throw to the flames.

1. Expressivism in a nutshell. Traditionally, accounts of explanatory claims are committed to descriptivist semantics. In other words, explanatory claims were taken to describe real relations between explanantia and explananda, and assertions thus express cognitive mental states. Cognitive mental states, paradigmatically beliefs, purport to represent the world in a particular way. By contrast, expressivism claims that explanatory claims express a kind of mental state, and more specifically a non-cognitive state. Unlike cognitive states, non-cognitive mental states (e.g. intentions) purport to make the world become one way or another, and figure first and foremost in our actions.  

Different expressivists deploy different kinds of non-cognitive mental states.  Gibbard (1990),  the foremost expressivist in metaethics, favors a complex (i.e. a combo of both cognitive and non-cognitive) mental state of ‘‘norm-acceptance’’. Concerning attributions of rationality, Gibbard (1986, 479) writes,

Thinking X rational…is a combination of a normative state and a state of factual belief. It is accepting a system N of norms such that one believes the subject to be in circumstances for which N permits X.

On Gibbard’s expressivism, the mental state expressed by claims of the form “X is rational” is complex, involving both a factual belief—that the subject is in circumstances for which N permits X—and a non-cognitive state—the acceptance of the system of norms N.

2. Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts. I’ll discuss the core ideas from this older paper, offering critical commentary along the way:

·      An audience A demands from a person S an explanation of p rather than q if and only if:

(1)  A undertakes commitment to the topic p;

(2)  A undertakes commitment to not-q;

(3)  A takes S as committed but not entitled to p and not-q; and

(4)  Given the uncontroversial commitments u that entitle one to p, a member of A’s epistemic community would be committed to q if she were committed to a controversial claim c.

Problem: controversy is not necessary for explanation. Example: it’s unclear why controversy is necessary for explaining “Why is the sky blue rather than green?” Would anybody be committed to the sky being green under any controversial commitments of which we can conceive? Minimally it appears ad hoc to insist on this.

·      S purports to explain p rather than q with h relative to controversial commitments c and uncontroversial commitments u if and only if:

(1)  S undertakes a commitment to h, p, and not-q; and

(2)  S takes h to entitle the strongest variant of p, not-q, c, and u to which S is committed.

Here, the strongest variant of a set of propositions will be the largest subset of those propositions closed under deduction.

·      S correctly explains p rather than q with h if:

(1)  S is entitled to h; and

(2)  h actually entitles the strongest variant of p, not-q, c, and u to which S is committed.

Problem: not clear how to articulate “actual entitlement.” I offered three different stories (dialectical, intersubjective, and objective), but find none to be satisfying.

***I WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN HEARING THE OTHER WAYS IN WHICH YOU FIND THIS PAPER'S IDEAS UNSATISFACTORY. AFTER ALL, THE AIM IS TO IMPROVE ON IT!***

3. From accountabilism to expressivism. I suggest the following expressivist amendments to my accountabilist view.

·      An audience A demands from a person S an explanation of p rather than q if and only if:

(1)  A believes p;

(2)  A believes not-q;

(3)  A accepts epistemic norms N;

(4)  A believes that S is in circumstances C;

(5)  According to N, if S is in C, then

a.     S is committed but not entitled to believe that p and not-q; and

b.     S is entitled to believe that p.

(6)  There exist an alternative set of epistemic norms N* such that according to N*, if S is in C, then S would be entitled to believe that q.

Note that there is no longer any reference to controversy or commitments, so the problems with the first formulation have evaporated. However, we will need to index all explanations to a system of norms N, a rival system of norms N*, and a set of circumstances C.

Next, let’s look at purported explanation.

·      S purports to explain p rather than q with h (relative to N, N*, and C) if and only if:

(1)  S believes that h, p, and not-q;

(2)  S believes that S is in C+, where C+ is the strongest variant of C that S believes;

(3)  S accepts a system of norms N+, where N+ is the most comprehensive intersection of N and N* that S accepts; and

(4)  According to N+,

a.     If S is in C+, then S is entitled to h

b.     If S is in circumstances C+ and h, then S is entitled to believe that p and not-q.

Now we get to the kicker: correct explanation is just purported explanation with the additional caveat that all of S’s beliefs are true. (Here I’ll bracket issues of realism about explanantia.) But observe what this means: take any four claims that could stand for p, not-q, h, and C+. There are no further true beliefs about whether these things could stand in a “correct” explanatory relationship; only norms that different people accept that then dictate these explanatory relationships. (Which isn’t to say that everything explains everything; such a reckless dictum is curtailed on this account largely by C+ and by any contingent overlap in our epistemic norms.)

**DO I LOSE ANYTHING IN THIS TRANSFORMATION?**

4. Implications of this view.

A. Dialectical Intuitions. This is all very speculative, but I think the main upshot of this view is that it inherits Chrisman’s (epistemic) expressivist solution to what he calls the “dialectical intuitions problem.” As he writes:

…by maintaining that knowledge claims express states of norm-acceptance rather than relativized factual beliefs, the epistemic expressivist …gains a second axis of possible opposition or agreement. That is, he can account for the intuition of cross-context opposition and agreement by claiming that the speakers are expressing pragmatically opposed or concurring states of norm acceptance, rather logically contradictory or identical descriptive beliefs (244).

In other words, there are still debates to be had about whether something is explanatory or not, but the debates might be factual (if they deal with the beliefs in question) and/or they might be pragmatic (if they only deal with how the contents of these beliefs are “explanatorily relevant” to one another).

B. Explanatory Skepticism. This gives us a new and strong version of what Nickel called explanatory skepticism. What counts as a suitable explanatory contrast, as well as what counts as satisfying a relevance relation with respect to such a contrast, is not determined by substantive semantic constraints (at least if semantics must be descriptivist), but must now involve pragmatic considerations about the epistemic norms that we accept. Its major upshot is that it provides a more precise account of how context affects explanatory claims. The specific contextual mechanisms involve the norms that the explainer and her audience accept.

Note that we need to distinguish explanatory skepticism from explanatory pluralism. If it turns out that everybody accepts the same norms when explaining, then although the view will still be skeptical (because the major constraints on explanations will be non-semantic and hence non-substantive), but it will not be pluralist. There will only be one way of explaining things: whichever way the preferred set of epistemic norms dictates.

However, we also have further reason to think that the relevant norms exhibit a good deal of variation. Lipton already countenances geometrical and non-contrastive explanations in addition to his preferred causal model. Furthermore, “Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts,” particularly its appendices, also provides independent support for explanatory pluralism. There are lots of different kinds of explanations within science (since then I’ve found even more!), so we can only imagine that adding math and ethics into the mix will make explanation all the more motley.

C. IBE. As a skeptical view, explanatory expressivism is not terribly congenial to IBE. In particular, it’s rather odd that a canon of inference would counsel not only the adoption of beliefs but also the acceptance of norms. Alternatively, it may point to the fact that IBE only makes sense if you accept certain epistemic norms. The question then becomes what norms they might be, and what non-acceptance of these norms entails. Consequently, in being entitled to the explanans—the signature inferential benefit of IBE—we may find ourselves entitled to far less than belief in the explanans’ truth, since a more modest set of norms would provide entitlement to something which falls short of truth, e.g. empirical adequacy.

As I said, this is all very speculative and new. But the exciting bit is that we get to think about these ideas together and try and hammer them out.

Week: Meta-Theories of Explanation

Weeks 4 and 5 (and beyond!): What is an explanation?

If we’re going to be able to assess IBE’s reliability as a pattern of inference, then we better be able to answer the question, “What is an explanation?” This is more or less a reprise of our earlier question, “What are the dominant views about explanation in the literature?” We’ll approach this in two stages. First, we’ll approach the more abstract question about what we should expect from our theories of explanation (this is a kind of “meta-theory of explanation”). Then, we’ll look at specific theories of explanation.

Week 4: Meta-Theories of Explanation

We’ll begin by looking at Lipton’s quick review of the explanation literature, in Chapter 2 of his book. (I stress that this is a very broad review; the literature gets more detailed very quickly.) Here, Lipton shows that several models of explanation (reason, familiarity, deductive-nomological, unification, and necessity) fail to satisfy several important criteria of adequacy: the why-regress, distinguishing evidence from explanation, asymmetries (i.e. that A explains B typically entails that B does not explain A), etc.

I’ll pair this with two readings that take opposing views about what we should be expecting from a theory of explanation. Nickel (2010) argues against explanatory skepticism.

Explanatory skeptics deny the existence of any distinctively explanatory information within or across domains. In other words, skeptics hold that whether A explains B depends on the background beliefs, commitments, practical interests, etc. of the person who is inquiring about A or B. By contrast, anti-skeptics claim that whether A explains B depends on certain features common to all explanations, regardless of inquirers' background beliefs, commitments, and interests. 

While Nickel rejects explanatory skepticism, my collaborators and I show that his arguments are inadequate (Díez,Khalifa, and Leuridan forthcoming). While this does not show that explanatory skepticism is correct, it shows that it is defensible.

And what follows if explanatory skepticism is defensible? Nickel (p. 308) does a nice job discussing three implications of this view: (1) "the special status of understanding is a chimera"; (2) "IBE is undermined," and (3) reduction's status as a "metaphysically important relation" is put into question. Let's also add that Lipton's quick dismissal of the five aforementioned models of explanation becomes far too quick. The skeptic can argue that the criteria of adequacy he uses to knock out these five models at best show that these models aren't universal templates of explanation, but then again, the skeptic will also claim that no such templates exist. Consequently, we are free to adopt the reason model in one context, the familiarity in another, etc., and worries about their susceptibility to why-regresses, asymmetries and the like are also constrained by context-specific interests, background beliefs, etc. Now, it may be the case that these worries crop up more frequently when deploying these kinds of explanations than, e.g. causal explanations, but the skeptic argues that this is simply a contingent fact emerging from most people's attitudes towards explanations, but is not thereby written into the "nature" of explanation.

Week 4: "Meta-Theories" of Explanation

Weeks 4 and 5 (and beyond!): What is an explanation?

If we’re going to be able to assess IBE’s reliability as a pattern of inference, then we better be able to answer the question, “What is an explanation?” This is more or less a reprise of our earlier question, “What are the dominant views about explanation in the literature?” We’ll approach this in two stages. First, we’ll approach the more abstract question about what we should expect from our theories of explanation (this is a kind of “meta-theory of explanation”). Then, we’ll look at specific theories of explanation.

We’ll begin by looking at Lipton’s quick review of the explanation literature, in Chapter 2 of his book. (I stress that this is a very broad review; the literature gets more detailed very quickly.) Here, Lipton shows that several models of explanation (reason, familiarity, deductive-nomological, unification, and necessity) fail to satisfy several important criteria of adequacy: the why-regress, distinguishing evidence from explanation, asymmetries (i.e. that A explains B typically entails that B does not explain A), etc.

I’ll pair this with two readings that take opposing views about what we should be expecting from a theory of explanation. Nickel (2010) argues against explanatory skepticism. Explanatory skeptics deny the existence of any distinctively explanatory information within or across domains. In other words, explanatory skeptics hold that whether A explains B depends mostly on the background beliefs, commitments, practical interests, etc. of the person who is inquiring about A or B. By contrast, anti-skeptics claim that whether A explains B depends on certain features common to all explanations, regardless of inquirers' background beliefs, commitments, and interests. 

While Nickel rejects explanatory skepticism, my collaborators and I show that his arguments are inadequate (Díez,Khalifa, and Leuridan forthcoming). While this does not show that explanatory skepticism is correct, it shows that it is defensible.

And what follows if explanatory skepticism is defensible? Nickel (p. 308) does a nice job discussing three implications of this view: (1) "the special status of understanding is a chimera"; (2) "IBE is undermined," and (3) reduction's status as a "metaphysically important relation" is put into question. Let's also add that Lipton's quick dismissal of the five aforementioned models of explanation becomes far too quick. The skeptic can argue that the criteria of adequacy he uses to knock out these five models at best show that these models aren't universal templates of explanation, but then again, the skeptic will also claim that no such templates exist. Consequently, we are free to adopt the reason model in one context, the familiarity in another, etc., and worries about their susceptibility to why-regresses, asymmetries and the like are also constrained by context-specific interests, background beliefs, etc. Now, it may be the case that these worries crop up more frequently when deploying these kinds of explanations than, e.g. causal explanations, but the skeptic argues that this is simply a contingent fact emerging from most people's attitudes towards explanations, but is not thereby written into the "nature" of explanation.