Understanding and (the neglect of) Fictionalism

So I’m going to go a bit off of the script here, and focus on the paper that I see emerging from these readings. This means talking a bit less about fictionalism, though the class will provide many opportunities to do so.

1.   Elgin vs. Mizrahi

Last week, we saw Elgin’s argument that understanding entails neither truth nor belief, but merely “true enough” acceptance. To repeat, her master argument was as follows:

(1)  There are some phenomena p such that for some propositions x:

a.          x is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.         x figures in scientific understanding of p.

(2)  For all propositions x, if x figures in scientific understanding of some phenomenon, then x is epistemically acceptable (120).

(3)  There are some propositions x such that x is acknowledged to be untrue and x is epistemically acceptable.

Elgin provided several examples from scientific practice to support Premise (1). The one of greatest interest for this week is the following:

(4)  There are some phenomena p, explained by some idealized law L, such that the proposition L:

a.     Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.     Figures in scientific understanding of p.

(5)  Thus, (1) is true.

Example: Ideal gas laws posit molecular structure and interactions that never obtains.

As we had already anticipated, there is a reply to this, which Mizrahi (2011) nicely discusses. We never need to acknowledge that the ideal gas law is untrue, for we are only ever committed to “Gas g behaves approximately like an ideal gas under conditions C” (where C specifies conditions of temperature, pressure, and the like.) Since it is true (not merely true enough) that the relevant gases behave approximately like ideal gases, this proposition (rather than the ideal gas law taken straight) need not (indeed, should not) be acknowledged as untrue. Furthermore, once we are dealing with propositions that are acknowledged to be true, the appropriate attitude to adopt is one of belief. Hence, true beliefs are still on firm ground, and understanding is still in the running as a species of knowledge.

2.   Potential theses for a paper…

Mizrahi’s paper is bad news for us—we’ve been scooped! What do we do? Here are some interesting observations from last week’s conversation that make things appear less bleak:

(1)  Mizrahi only does this with the ideal gas law, we can do the yeoman’s work of covering all of the other kinds of felicitous falsehoods that Elgin catalogues (e.g. stylized facts, curve-smoothing, etc.) By itself this is probably not a terribly exciting contribution to the literature, but not completely idle either.

(2)  We had other strategies available to us. For instance, critiquing premise (2) of Elgin’s Master Argument. This is certainly worth exploring, though there seemed to be some consensus that this would amount to little more than battling over definitions about “epistemic,” “cognitive,” and “pragmatic.”

(3)  We briefly mentioned another strategy—that of actually granting that felicitous falsehoods could figure in understanding, whilst denying that this precluded understanding from being a species of knowledge. I see two ways of arguing for this strategy.

a.     Semantic strategy. One option is to defend the idea that: If q explains p is true, then q need not be approximately true.

1.     What would be exciting about this strategy is that it would actually challenge both Elgin and Mizrahi.

a.     Pace Elgin, one could have the true belief that q explains p, but this could be a felicitous falsehood.

b.     Pace Mizrahi, this would say that understanding need not even be quasi-factive, for q could be radically false and still provide understanding via its explanatory role.

2.     Turning back to knowledge, the key bit would be the following inference would have defensible premises:

a.     If S understands why p, then there is some q such that S knows that q explains p.

b.     If S knows that q explains p, then q explains p is true.

c.     If q explains p is true, then q need not be approximately true.

d.     So if S understands why p, then there is some q such that S knows that q explains p, and q need not be approximately true.

3.     The key is defending premise 2.c.

a.     One option might be the following:

                                                                                                     i.     Our concept of explanation already tolerates “true enough” explanantia.

                                                                                                   ii.     True enough propositions that are not explanantia (or at least do not play an explanatory role of some sort) do not figure in our understanding.

                                                                                                  iii.     Hence explanatory propositions (q explains p) are true (full stop), even if their components (q and p) can be true enough.

b.     Epistemological Strategy:  Another option is to argue that it is possible that S knows that q explains p, even if S only accepts that q explains p.

                                               i.     There is a precursor to this, namely Cohen’s An essay on belief and acceptance

1.     I haven’t read this yet.

                                             ii.     This argument would run as follows:

1.     If S understands why p, then there is some q such that S knows that q explains p.

2.     If S knows that q explains p, then S accepts that q explains p.

3.     If S accepts that q explains p, then S need not believe that q explains p.

4.     So if S understands why p, then there is some q such that S knows that q explains p, and S need not believe that q explains p.

Three questions arise: What exactly is the difference between the Semantic and the Epistemological Strategy? Second, which we do adopt? And in either case, how do we defend the respective core claim?

3.   Semantic vs. Epistemological Strategy       

Looking at the relevant foils to these strategies best illustrates the difference between them. One foil is what we might call the “vanilla version” of an account of explanatory knowledge. That view would hold:

(1)  If S knows that q explains p, then q explains p is true.

(2)  If q explains p is true, then q and p are true.

(3)  If S knows that q explains p, then S believes that q explains p.

Elgin’s reasoning seems to be as follows. She grants the preceding three assumptions, then adds:

(4)  One can understand without having a true belief that q explains p.

From this, she infers:

(5)  So understanding is not a species of knowledge.

Let us assume, for simplicity’s sake, that if one understands then one has some sort of attitude about an explanatory proposition q explains p. Now, our endgame is to deny (5), but granting that this argument is valid, this means that we must deny one of the premises (1)-(4). The Epistemological Strategy denies (1) and (3), but is squarely committed to (4). By contrast, the Semantic Strategy denies (2), but can remain agnostic, if not tilted towards opposition, about (4). That’s the difference.

4.   Which Strategy?

            But which strategy should we pursue? There is a temptation to pursue both, but I think this is a mistake that many young researchers make. Since either would be interesting on its own, it would be far better to develop one really solidly, and then save the other for your next project. This is partly strategic: that’s two lines on your vita rather than one! But it’s also good for generating the best paper possible: given finite resources, it’s better to have one well developed position rather than two worse developed positions.

            OK, so which one? Well, part of this is just wherever your gut takes you—where do you see the stronger argument? With which literature are you more comfortable? But that’s not the whole story. There is also a question about the logical interrelations between (1)-(4). Specifically, Elgin’s critique of the vanilla version shares many assumptions with its target—namely (1)-(3)—but Elgin clearly privileges (2):

(6)  There are understanding-providing explanations of the form q explains p where either q or p is false.

(7)  By (2) and (6), q explains p is false.

(8)  By  (1) and (7), S does not know that q explains p.

(9)  If q explains p is false, then the appropriate attitude to it when it provides understanding is not belief.

(10)        By (7) and (9), the appropriate attitude to understanding-providing explanations is not belief.

(11)        So by (3) and (10), S does not know that q explains p.

So, (2) and (6) are the most basic premises in Elgin’s argument. Note that rebutting (6) is just to retrace Mizrahi’s steps, so rebutting (2) is really the way to shed new light on this conversation. This means that we should pursue the Semantic Strategy.

5.   How to defend the Semantic Strategy?

            What’s cool about this is that we can answer the last of our three questions. We can use Elgin’s same arguments to defend our challenge to (2)—but draw a very different and indeed more modest conclusion. On this view, we agree with her that false propositions figure in explanations (and other chunks of discourse/bodies of information), but this does not preclude understanding from being a species of knowledge. Thus, we can know that q explains p even if we don’t know that q (because, e.g. q is false).

            Next, we need to motivate this position. Here is at least one suggestive strategy: what if antirealism is correct? Then understanding is surely not factive. Hence if Elgin is right, it would seem that antirealism precludes understanding from being a species of knowledge (Elgin actually makes this argument elsewhere). Moreover, everything Mizrahi says indicates that he agrees with Elgin on this point. So, if it is possible to be an antirealist and maintain that understanding is a species of knowledge, then both Elgin and Mizrahi are incorrect. It is possible to be an antirealist and maintain that understanding is a species of knowledge (namely in those possible worlds where the Semantic Strategy succeeds). So both Elgin and Mizrahi are incorrect.
            So, there’s an outline of a paper somewhere in this. It goes something like this:

What is the thesis? Because true explanations can have false explanantia, understanding can be a species of knowledge.

What is the argument?

I.               If Elgin’s argument is sound, then understanding is not a species of knowledge.

II.             Elgin’s argument is not sound.

a.     Defend the idea that q explains p does not entail q.

III.           If Mizrahi’s argument is sound, then understanding is a species of knowledge.

IV.           Mizrahi’s argument is not sound.

a.     Defend the idea that antirealists are not opposed to understanding.

V.             Present a sound argument that understanding is a species of knowledge.

a.     If S understands why p, then there is some q such that S knows that q explains p.

b.     If S knows that q explains p, then q explains p is true.

c.     If q explains p is true, then q need not be approximately true.

d.     So if S understands why p, then there is some q such that S knows that q explains p, and q need not be approximately true.

Understanding and Truth

Let’s take stock of where we are. We’ve seen that if Inference to the Best Explanation is to be defensible, then there must be some link between loveliness and likeliness. In other words, we infer that explanation that, if true, would provide the greatest understanding. Furthermore, we’ve argued that understanding might be a species of explanatory knowledge. In this case, we infer the potential explanation that, if true, would provide the greatest explanatory knowledge. Given what we know about knowledge, this means that IBE amounts to the following:

All else being equal, an explanation provides the greatest understanding if and only if it:

1.     Provides the greatest number of true beliefs about explanations;

2.     Provides the best justification for these beliefs; and

3.     Renders these beliefs as luck-free or ‘safe’ as possible.

(A passing observation: There will be circumstances where these three conditions pull us in opposite directions. In this case, IBE will not provide clear counsel, or we will need some way to rank conditions (1)-(3)’s inferential importance.)

            We’ve already had a go at condition (3), when we discussed Morris vs. Grimm. This week, we’ll look at (1). After giving a brief gloss on Khalifa vs. Lipton, I’ll devote a chunk of this to Elgin’s paper. We can discuss further details about how Lipton and I disagree in class.

(1)  Lipton vs. Khalifa

Inferentially speaking, the first of these conditions is most important, since an inference is typically assessed by how well the truth of the premises secures the truth of the conclusion. However, this is also the most contentious claim in this week’s readings. Moreover, challenging the role of truth in understanding forces a corresponding adjustment in the role of belief, for to believe that p entails taking p as true. While Lipton finds nothing problematic with these points, Elgin and I demur. I’ll quickly go through my schtick vs. Lipton.

One challenge to the idea that understanding entails true beliefs is that we have no means of making sure that a true explanation is to be found among the potential explanations that we’re considering. This is called the underconsideration or bad lot argument. Historically, this gets lots of purchase from the fact that many of current best explanations (coming from relativity, quantum, evolution, plate tectonics, etc.) were not considered for long stretches in the history of science.

Lipton tries to dispel this worry on more or less a priori grounds, by setting certain kinds of ground rules, e.g. the Ranking Premise, the claim that scientists reliably rank explanations. He attempts to show that this cannot be held consistently with the No Privilege assumption, which holds that no true explanation is to be found in the ranks of considered explanations. As I show, Lipton’s argument fails to account for the non-monotonicity of inductive inference. Non-monotonicity is the idea that the goodness of an inference is affected by the addition of new information, such that A is a good reason to believe B, but A & E is not a good reason to believe B, A & E & F is a good reason to believe B, etc.

Realists also are fond of invoking background theories to make their case. Roughly, the idea is that some aspect of explanatory reasoning would be very unlikely if the background theories used in such reasoning were radically false. As I argue, these appeals generally don’t live up to their billing, in large part because something less than true background theories could do the trick.

Since we understand a good deal, I don’t think that the first condition is necessary for understanding: a good explanation might not provide very many true beliefs about explanations. Note that this denial can be heard in at least three ways:

(A)  A good explanation can provide very few true beliefs about explanations;

(B)  A good explanation can provide many untrue beliefs about explanations;

(C)  A good explanation can provide many true non-beliefs about explanations.

These can—but need not—intersect. My paper says nothing about the quantity of explanations a good explanation provides, though since I think explanatory virtues/considerations can be justificatory, and consilience is a virtue, let’s drop (A) from further consideration: a good explanation has to explain a lot.

            That leaves us with (B) and (C). Furthermore, I’ve put them in negative terms, but of course they also admit of positive glosses. Specifically, I had in mind the following:

(B_K)     A good explanation can entitle people to beliefs about explanations.

Essentially, this says that we should give up on the truth that good explanations provide, and focus on the justification. (I do make some concessions to veriphiles, but the kind of concessions that aren’t likely to make them very happy.)

Questions

1.     Adopt the position of Lipton, and read my paper. Am I uncharitable to him at any juncture?

2.     Even if my criticisms are right, my antirealist proposal may be wrong. Give me hell.

(2)  Elgin’s “True Enough” (2004)

Elgin provides a distinct set of challenges to the idea that understanding provides true explanatory beliefs. (She doesn’t say too much about explanations, so let’s bracket that issue for now.) The next few weeks or so, we’ll be focusing quite a bit on her work, as she provides a really interesting challenge to my view. Roughly, Elgin argues that understanding is not factive (i.e. doesn’t entail truth). Since knowledge is factive, this would appear to imply that understanding is not a species of knowledge. Bad news for my view, right?

             I’ll explain why I’m not worried (yet) by Elgin’s challenge, perhaps in class. First, I want you to see how I go about readying myself for addressing work with which I aim to disagree. The first crucial step is getting the person’s arguments down. So that’s where I’m starting:

Elgin’s Main Argument:

(1)  There are some phenomena p such that for some propositions x:

a.     x is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.     x figures in scientific understanding of p.

(2)  For all propositions x, if x figures in scientific understanding of some phenomenon, then x is epistemically acceptable (120).

(3)  There are some propositions x such that x is acknowledged to be untrue and x is epistemically acceptable.

(NB: The aim is to always reconstruct the author’s argument so as to make it valid. This is an important principle of charity, and also frees you up to focus on the veracity of the premises.)

Arguments for Premise (1)

A. Curve-Smoothing

(CS)     There are some phenomena p, represented by a smooth curve C, such that the proposition all of the data points lie on C:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

Argument for (CS.b.ii):

In the relevant examples, consider an extremely jagged curve C* such that all of the data points lie on C*.

Because C* is jagged, C is not an intelligible pattern.

But if C is not an intelligible pattern, then p is not understood scientifically.

B. Ceteris Paribus

(CP)    There are some phenomena p, explained by some law of the form All else being equal, all Fs are Gs, such that the proposition all else is equal:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

C. Idealizations

(I)        There are some phenomena p, explained by some idealized law L, such that the proposition L:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

Example: Ideal gas laws posit molecular structure and interactions that never obtains.

D. Stylized Facts

(SF)     There are some phenomena p, such that the proposition representing p:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

Example: Economic models aim to explain why profit rates are constant, though profit rates are not constant.

E. A fortiori arguments from limiting cases

(AF)    There are some phenomena p, explained on analogy with a limiting case C, such that the proposition is p is identical to C:

a.              Is acknowledged to be untrue, and

b.              Figures in scientific understanding of p.

Thus, (1) is true.

Elaboration of Premise (2)

Elgin doesn’t really argue for (2). Instead, she provides a plausible just-so story about how epistemic acceptance could diverge from belief:

(1)  To cognitively accept that p is to take it that p’s divergence from truth, if any, does not matter cognitively.

(2)  If something figures in an understanding of how things are, then it matters cognitively.

(3)  To cognitively accept that p is to take it that p’s divergence from truth, if any, does not figure in an understanding of how things are, i.e. p is “true enough.” [See 120]

Elgin continues this elaboration (A), and then rebuts a potential objection (B).

A. Under what conditions does divergence from the truth cognitively matter?

Let p be a candidate for acceptability. Acceptable propositions “belong to and perform function in [i.e. figure in] larger bodies of discourse, such as arguments, explanations, or theories that have purposes.” (121) Whether or not p is true enough depends on several contextual factors:

(Context)   The larger body of discourse D to which p belongs. For example, other elements in D, such as background assumptions, affect p’s acceptability.

(Purpose)  p is true enough for D’s purpose, i.e. true enough to serve certain D’s ends.

(Function) If p performs no role in achieving D’s purpose, then p is not true enough.

B. Veritistic Alternative, with Reply

Those who hold that inquiry is always truth-driven (veritists), might well argue that the function of all acceptable propositions is to approximate the truth.

Elgin’s critiques of this proposal:

(1) Not all approximations perform the same function (122). Some approximations are less accurate, but better “serve as evidence or constraints on future theorizing” than their more accurate counterparts, e.g. a first-order approximation that admits of an analytical solution vs. a second-order equation that does not. In this case, “A felicitous falsehood thus is not always accepted only in default of the truth. Nor is its acceptance always ‘second best.’ It may make cognitive contributions that the unvarnished truth cannot match.” (122)

(2) Not all felicitous falsehoods are approximations. The value of an idealization is not always directly proportional to its approximating the truth.

Fictions

If you're still on Elgin's bandwagon at this point, she's still elaborating her very interesting picture of understanding. In particular, how is it that an acceptable proposition can be false (strictly speaking) yet provide understanding that is somehow constrained by the facts? Elgin suggests that acceptable propositions (what she sometimes calls "felicitous falsehoods") are better construed as fictions than as mistaken or inaccurate statements of fact. Elgin then elaborates that fictions shed light on reality through a cognitive process called exemplification (A), and rebuts an objection to this proposal.

  

A. Exemplification

Elgin argues that various proposals by Lewis, Walton, Yablo, and Kitcher about fictions all fail because they cannot tell us why something fictitious can shed light on how we understand real things.

She offers exemplification as a more promising alternative.
 

1. A simple example of exemplification: Paint samples exemplify the colors of different paints.

           

2. Why acceptable propositions are just like paint samples: Just as “something other than paint can serve as a paint sample, affording epistemic access to a color also instantiated by the paint,” so “something other than [e.g.] a molecule exemplify molecular structure, thereby affording epistemic access to a structure also instantiated by the molecule. A felicitous falsehood then is a fiction that exemplifies a feature in a context where the exemplification of that feature contributes to understanding…They qualify as fictions because they diverge from the phenomena in unexemplified properties.” (126)

B. Possible Objection: Exemplifying Fictions are simply a way station to the truth

We often begin with a highly idealized model, and then make corrections to get closer to the truth. Hence, it’s the corrections, rather than the fictions that they correct, which are more epistemically valuable. As before, this would play into the veritist's hands.

Elgin offers three replies to this objection:

(1)   Some corrections are unnecessary or unproductive. A fortiori arguments from limiting cases are one such example.

(2)   In practice, corrections are not always aimed at truth, but only at more refined models. “They replace one falsehood with another.”

(3)   Even where corrections yield truths, fictions can “structure our understanding in a way that makes available information we would not otherwise have access to.”

C. Possible Objection: Replacing Truth with Truth-Enough Leads to Intractable Relativism

There is a still another objection to Elgin's view. Suppose that a theory attesting to the healing powers of crystals is offered, and the inquirer in question aims to sell more healing crystals. Won’t the claim that some crystals heal be true enough?

Elgin’s Reply: “A theory can claim to make sense of a range of facts only if it is factually defeasible—only if, that is, there is some reasonably determinate, epistemically accessible factual arrangement which, if it were found to obtain, would discredit the theory.” (129)

Furthermore, “an acceptable theory must be at least as good as any available alternative, when judged in terms of currently available standards of cognitive goodness.” (129)

This helps to pinpoint truth’s role in understanding: “A factually defeasible theory has epistemically accessible implications which, if found to be false, discredit the theory. So a defeasible theory, by preserving a commitment to testable consequences retains a commitment to truth.” Such a view is still compatible with there being other propositions in the theory which are acknowledged to be false.

Questions

1.     Look at Elgin’s various arguments (the Main Argument, the Arguments for Premise (1), and the Argument for Premise (2)). What strikes you as a dubious piece of reasoning? Why? Can you provide an argument to that effect?